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EVIDENCE, ENTITLED BELIEF,
AND THE GOSPELS
Nicholas Wolterstorff

In this paper I discuss the conditions under which a person is entitled to believe the
gospels. And in particular, I have my eye on the Enlightenment thesis that one is not
entitled to do so unless one has collected adequate evidence concerning the reliability of
the writers and the content of what they said, and has adequately appraised this evidence.
There is no way of answering our question, however, without asking it with respect to
some interpretation of the gospels. Accordingly I explain and use Hans Frei's contention,
that the gospels are identity narratives concerning Jesus of Nazareth.

Human beings in good measure live by tradition until their traditions are in crisis.
The philosophers of the Enlightenment regarded the traditions of Europe as in
deep crisis. In their judgment those traditions were the cause of pervasive
benightedness, chicanery, and oppression. But even apart from that, the Reformation had fragmented the moral and religious traditions of Europe so that even
if one still wished to live by tradition, one now had to choose which one.
It was in full awareness of this social crisis, and in response thereto, that the
proto-Enlightenment philosopher John Locke insisted that, insofar as the press
of one's other obligations permitted, one ought to examine what is handed over
to one as tradition before accepting it. Of course Socrates had long before insisted
on examining tradition. For Socrates, examination was a social enterprise, of
one person propounding a thesis and others offering refutations-the Socratic
elenchos. The examination proposed by Locke and embraced by the Enlightenment was different, not inherently social: Given a thesis, one first collects
adequate evidence pro and con; one then adequately scrutinizes the relation of
the thesis to the evidence so as to determine the probability of the former on the
latter; and finally, one believes or disbelieves the thesis with a firmness proportioned to the probability one has determined it to have on the evidence. For the
sake of convenience, let me call this complex activity, the evidential activity.
Some propositions are immediately evident to one or seen by one to be entailed
by such. For such, one need not perform the evidential activity. But for any
other proposition, being entitled to believe it is conditional on one's performance
of this evidential activity-once again, insofar as time permits. In particular,
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being entitled to accept what is handed down as tradition is conditional on having
performed the evidential activity.
At the center of the moral and religious traditions of the West was the Biblehanded down as tradition and within tradition. The thinkers of the Enlightenment,
including Locke, did not shrink from applying their entitlement thesis to believing
the Bible. Some thought that the result of practicing the evidential activity on
religious convictions would be the disappearance of "revealed religion" in favor,
at most, of "natural religion." Others did not anticipate this result. But all agreed
that one is entitled to believe what the biblical writers say only if one has first
performed the evidential activity on that. Sapere aude!
In this paper I want to assess the acceptability of this "not entitled to ... unless" thesis concerning believing the Bible--or rather, I want to consider its
acceptability for the gospels, not on this occasion for the Bible in general. My
discussion will thus probe one of the deepest points of contact and conflict
between the Christian tradition and the mentality of the Enlightenment-a mentality which in large measure became, and in large measure remains, the mentality
of modernity.
I shall not here ask what constitutes adequate evidence nor how one tells when
one has it. Neither will I ask what constitutes adequate appraisal of evidence.
Nor will I inquire into the nature of probability. All obscurities in these conceptsand they are rich in obscurities-will on this occasion be set off to the side so
that we can focus on the heart of the matter: Is it true that to be entitled to
believe what the gospel writers say one must first do this other thing: Perform
the evidential activity? On this occasion I shall not even inquire into the proportionality thesis: That one ought to proportion the firmness of one's belief to the
strength of one's evidence for it.
Among those who have rejected the Lockean thesis, some have espoused
alternative proposals as to things one must do before one is permitted to believe
the gospels. Though here I cannot consider those alternative proposals, our
discussion will provide material useful for appraising them. And by the end we
will have learned something about the proper role of Reason and reasoning in
our lives, and something about the dynamics which lead to acceptance of tradition
and our obligations with respect to those dynamics.
But there is an obstacle that the epistemologist must deal with before he can
even set out on his inquiry. A vast variety of interpretations have been offered
of the gospels. And different interpretations raise different epistemological issues;
the epistemological considerations raised by Kant's interpretation are fundamentally different from those raised by a "literalist" interpretation. Thus the epistemologist has to choose an interpretation, or type of interpretation, with which
to work. How is he to make his choice?
One feature of hermeneutics and epistemology in the contemporary world is
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that they almost al ways go their separate ways. Especially is this true of hermeneutics in the continental tradition and epistemology in the Anglo-American tradition.
Each typically thinks the other obscure or naive or both. Because I regard this
indifference and scorn as regrettable, my aim will be to work with an interpretation
of the gospels which, in its main lines, not only seems plausible to me but has
standing in the hermeneutical community.
But let us back up a moment. Why not understand the activity of interpretation
in general as the attempt to discover what a text says, and then pose our epistemological questions concerning what the gospel texts say? Why let hermeneutics
get in the way of epistemology?
The tempting answer is that there are disputes over what the gospel-texts say.
The correct answer is that there is no such thing as what a text says. Of course,
strictly and literally only persons say things, not texts. But that is not my point.
Even in a metaphorical sense there is no such thing, for a text, as what it says.
And so no such thing as discovering what it says. Interpretation, at bottom, is
not a matter of discernment but of choice and habit. We human beings adopt
interpretations of texts and follow rules which assign interpretations to textsoften without deliberation. But for every text it is possible to adopt other interpretations or follow other rules assigning interpretations. To arrive at an interpretation
of a text one needs more than careful reading of the text. One needs a purpose
which the interpretation is to serve or a criterion which it is to satisfy. Different
purposes and criteria lead to different interpretations of the same text.
Most of us most of the time for most texts want an interpretation which
coincides with what the writer used the text to say. (Not with what he intended
to use it to say; with what he did use it to say.) But sometimes we have goals
which lead us to adopt other interpretations. The church in its liturgical use of
the Psalms has long operated with interpretations far removed from what the
original authors meant (said) with the text.
In saying what I have been saying, what have I been taking an interpretation
to be'? More specifically, what is the ontological status of that? An interpretation
has, as its core, sequences of speech actions. And most of those speech actions
can be onto logically assayed as states of affairs coupled with actions performed
on those states of affairs: the action of asserting, of fictionalizing, or whatever.
It is this core on which I shall focus my attention in what follows. Let it be
added that this core does not exhaust what I mean by an interpretation. Texts
typically have significance beyond the speech actions associated with them by
the adoption of an interpretation; some of this also belongs to an interpretation.'
By way of contrast to my usage here, there are things called "interpretations"Freudian interpretations, for example-which are not speech actions associated
with a text but explanations of the origins of the text.
I have not said, and will not try to say, what it is that one does with a text
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and a sequence of speech actions when one adopts the latter as an interpretation
of the former. The point I have wanted to make about adopting an interpretation
is just that, for any text, one has options. Of course there are limits on the
options. One cannot properly adopt a sequence of speech actions as an interpretation of a text unless it is possible to perform those speech actions with that text.
But if we are fully to understand why hermeneutics gets in the way of epistemology when we want to reflect on the phenomenon of accepting the gospels,
we must do more than notice that, at bottom, interpretations of texts are to be
adopted rather than discerned. For in principle there might be a standard interpretation of the gospel texts in a certain community-in the church, for example.
If there were, it would be eminently relevant to ask: Under what circumstances
would one be entitled to believe the standard interpretation of the gospels?
Though in the late antique and medieval worlds there was, apparently, a more
or less standard interpretation of the gospels in the church, at least of their
so-called "literal sense," that is no longer the case. Several developments have
caused the change. Perhaps most important is that the canonical function of the
gospels in the church, when combined with "the modem mind," gives powerful
impetus to the devising of new interpretations.
For a community to take a text as canonical is to bind itself to use that text
in certain ways. Those ways may be, and usually are, diverse. The community,
for example, may bind itself to use the text liturgically. Yet it is typical, if not
definitive, of canonical functioning that the text is regarded and treated by the
community as authoritative for its beliefs and practices. This, in tum, typically
has two sides: the community binds itself to believe (some, at least, of) the
content of the interpretations to be adopted of its texts. And the community binds
itself to treat its interpretations as authoritative for the process of arriving at
beliefs on other matters. My phrase, "the community binds itself to believe
(treat),' is intentionally ambiguous. The members of the community may hold
that they have an obligation to do this. Or they may hold that one has an obligation
not to ally oneself with the community unless one does this.
Imagine, then, a community and a text such that the members of the community
believe that the text ought to function among them in ways which we (theoreticians) would describe as functioning canonically. Sometimes there will be a
preference in the community for a certain version of the text-the community
may even authorize a certain version. And always in such a community there
will be the social practice of interpreting the text. As a consequence of the
presence of that practice there will be preferred (though usually, nonetheless,
contested) methods of interpreting the text, maybe even authorized methods.
And for some or all of the text there may even be an authorized interpretation.
The more or less articulate views in the community as to the canonical functioning
of the text will include views as to what in the acceptable interpretations is
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authoritative for life, and for which dimensions of life it is authoritative. A
community can take a text as authoritative without regarding everything in it as
authoritative and without regarding all of life as falling under its authority. (For
example, authoritative "for faith and morals" but not for science.)
Now suppose someone argues to the community that at some points its hithertoacceptable interpretations of its hitherto-acceptable versions cannot function, or
should not function, in accord with the community's convictions concerning the
authority of such interpretations. Then, if the argument is at all persuasive, the
community will be cast into crisis, be it major or minor. In the extreme case,
the community will respond by removing the offending text from its canon.
Short of that, it has a variety of ways of extricating itself from crisis. It can
reject the argument and continue on its established course. Or conceding the
cogency of the argument, it can change its views on canonical functioning, or
adopt new interpretations, or (sometimes) embrace new versions of the text.
What I have presented as a thought-experiment has in fact happened to the
church in modem times with respect to its canonically functioning scriptures-in
particular, with respect to the gospels. The church traditionally took the gospel
writers to be assertively uttering the words of the text. And traditionally it took
its commitment to the canonicity of these writings as including the obligation
to believe what the writers said-the obligation to take as true the what-the-writerasserted interpretation of the text. But many over the past three centuries have
argued that they cannot, or that we should not, believe all that. This has loosed
the whirlwind. All the strategies mentioned above have been followed without,
for very many of the predicaments, consensus emerging as to which strategy is
best. However, in many cases members of the church, wishing to preserve the
canonical status of the gospels but finding themselves incapable of believing the
older interpretations, have sought to ease the tension by adopting new interpretations. Thus it is that there is no longer such a thing as a standard interpretation.
What have been the claims of the dissenters? Many different claims. But four
sorts have been prominent:
(1) That among the gospels there are discrepancies of such a sort that the
members of a pair of writers cannot both be correct in what they claim to have
happened.
(2) That we have good and sufficient reason, from sources external to the
gospels, to suppose that some of the events which the writers claim to have
happened did not happen-that we have good and sufficient reason, for example,
to not believe that Jesus performed the "signs and wonders" attributed to him. 2
(3) That we have good and sufficient reason to suppose that the interpretation
of the identity of Jesus which the gospel writers present is not accurate.
(4) That we have good and sufficient reason to suppose that what the gospel
writers say is incorrect with respect to its 'particularity."
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II

All texts allow for different interpretations; and no longer is there in the church
a standard interpretation of the gospels. That is what makes picking an interpretation about which we can raise our epistemological question a problematical
matter. Of course it remains open to pick as one's interpretation what the writer
(redactor) used the text to say. But since there is a multiplicity of views as to
what the gospel writers used their texts to say, this does not deliver us from our
predicament.
Perhaps, though, there is less reason for despair on this latter point than there
appears to be. For perhaps most of the interpretations which have been proposed
in modem times violate some general principle for determining what the writers
used these texts to say. That, in any case, was the argument of Hans Frei in his
now well-known book, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative." I propose making use
of Frei's argument for our endeavor.
The core of Frei's argument can be simply stated. Large parts of the Bible in
general and of the gospels in particular, belong to the literary genre of realistic
narrative. Any proposed interpretation of the gospels which does not appropriately acknowledge that genre of the text is unacceptable as a construal of what
the gospel writers meant. In fact, however, most of the innovative interpretations
offered over the last two centuries violate this criterion. S
Frei always credited Erich Auerbach's Mimesis with first delineating the genre
of realistic narrative and with pointing out that the gospels, for the most part,
belong to that genre. Let me quote, somewhat lengthily, Frei's best delineation
of the genre:
By speaking of the narrative shape of these accounts, I suggest that
what they are about and how they make sense are functions of the
depiction or narrative rendering of the events constituting themincluding their being rendered, at least partially, by the device of
chronological sequence .... There are, of course, other kinds of stories
that merely illustrate something we already know; and there are other
stories yet that function in such a way as to express or conjure up an
insight or an affective state that is beyond any and all depiction so that
stories, though inadequate, are best fitted for the purpose because they
are evocations, if not invocations, of a common archetypal consciousness
or a common faith. In both of these latter cases the particular rendering
is not indispensable, though it may be helpful to the point being
made ....
This is one of the chief characteristics of a narrative that is "realistic."
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In that term I include more than the indispensability of the narrative
shape, including chronological sequence, to the meaning, theme, or
subject matter of the story. The term realistic I take also to imply that
the narrative depiction is of that peculiar sort in which characters or
individual persons, in their internal depth or subjectivity as well as in
their capacity as doers and sufferers of actions or events, are firmly and
significantly set in the context of the external environment, natural but
more particularly social. Realistic narrative is that kind in which subject
and social setting belong together, and characters and external circumstances fitly render each other. Neither character nor circumstance
separately, nor yet their interaction, is a shadow of something else more
real or more significant. Nor is the one more important than the other
in the story. "What is character but the determination of incident? What
is incident but the illustration of character?" asked Henry James.
In all these respects-inseparability of subject matter from its depiction or cumulative rendering, literal rather than symbolic quality of the
human subject and his social context, mutual rendering of character,
circumstance, and their interaction-a realistic narrative is like a historical account. 6
From this it is clear that, on Frei' s view, there are two defining marks of
realistic narrative. The one he mentions first is the one to which he most often
appeals in his rejection of a wide range of modem interpretations of the gospels.
The second-which unlike the first is strictly a genre of projected world rather
than of text--comes to the fore when he elucidates the structure of his own
interpretation of the gospels in his later book, The Identity of Jesus Christ.
What exactly is that first characteristic? Let me put into my own words what
seems to me Frei's point. In an earlier work of mine, Works and Worlds of Art,7
I developed the notion of the projected world of a text for the author: that
conjunction of states of affairs such that the author's inscription of the text counts
as his performing one and another kind of mood-action on those states of affairs.
The projected world is that, along with whatever else would be appropriately
extrapolated from that conjunction. Shortly I will clarify the notion of counting
as. As to my neologism, "mood-action," I think its meaning will be communicated
sufficiently for our purposes here if I cite just a few examples: asserting, commanding, asking, and fictionally presenting.
The fact that I do speak simply of the projected world of a text but rather of
the projected world of a text for its author reflects the point made earlier, that
texts do not themselves say something. Frei, however, regularly talks as if texts
do just say something, and thereby do just have correct interpretations. I think
that is due, in whole or in part, to the fact that though he has his eye on projected
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worlds, he speaks of these as the meanings of texts." For texts do just have
meanings. A text is always a text in a language. It consists of a sequence of
sentences in a language and those sentences have meanings in that language.
But it is of prime importance to notice that the state of affairs we project with
a sentence (and the mood in which we project it) can differ from one occasion
to another without there being any difference of meaning in the sentence(s) we
use. If you assertively utter "I feel dizzy" and I assertively utter "1 feel dizzy,"
there is no difference of meaning in the words we have uttered. Yet we have
asserted different things. So too, if I use a word in some sentence literally and
you use it metaphorically, our words will be the same and will mean the same;
but we will have asserted different things.
Of course the word "meaning" is a highly ambiguous word; one would not
misuse it if one said, about the case just imagined, that you meant one thing,
namely, that you felt dizzy, and that I meant a different thing, namely that I felt
dizzy. It seems likely that what has happened to Frei is that the ambiguity of
the word "meaning" has led him to speak of a text as just having a meaning,
when what he has his eye on is the different phenomenon of someone meaning
something by writing a text. A text's having a meaning is not to be identified
with a person's meaning something with that text. Text-meaning is different
from author-meaning. Frei's concern throughout is clearly with author-meaning.
Let me now, for the moment, blend Frei's parlance with my own. The meaning
of a realistic narrative text is its projected world, its story. And that, Frei adds,
is the whole of its meaning. What is it that Frei wishes to claim by saying that
this is the whole of its meaning? That is not entirely clear, partly because of the
weight Frei places on the slippery word "meaning," partly also because he wishes
to exclude a wide range of options all at once. Yet I think one can see what he
is driving at.
Frei characteristically says that it is a mistake to suppose that a realistic
narrative is about something other than itself, a mistake to suppose that it refers
to something other than itself, a mistake to suppose that its meaning lies outside
itself. I think the best way to get a clear fix on the point Frei is driving at is to
take two of his rejections as paradigmatic for what he wishes to reject in general.
One sort of text which Frei cites as not belonging to the genre of realistic
narrative is the fable-text. Aesop, by composing his fable-text, fictionally projected a story; and his doing that counted, in tum, as his asserting something
else, namely, the 'moral.' Another type of text which Frei cites as not belonging
to the genre of realistic narrative is the allegorical text. Bunyan, by composing
his allegory-text, fictionally projected a story; and his doing that counted, in
tum, as his assertive projection of another state of affairs-that one also sequential
in structure. Generalizing from these examples, I suggest that the point Frei
wishes to make is that realistic narrative texts are texts which are apt for pro-
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jecting---either in the assertive or the fictional mode-worlds which in their
structure are 'realistic' narratives; and which are not apt for being used in such
a way that one' s projection of that world (story) counts in turn as one's projecting
of yet some other state of affairs.
Of course Frei does not deny that realistic narrative texts often serve to express
the feelings of their authors, are often genetically derived from historical episodes,
often have consequences in the consciousness and lives of readers. But these
are not, as he sees it, relationships of meaning. 9 Suppose we distinguish between
two types of action-generation, that is, two ways of doing one thing by doing
another: causal-generation and count-generation. By flipping the switch I turn
on the light; the connection is a causal one. By turning on the blinkers I signal
a left tum; the connection is that of one action counting as another. It appears
to be Frei's intuition-sound one, I might add-that only count-generation yields
meaning as he means 'meaning.'
The next point in Frei's argument is his claim that most innovative modem
proposals as to the author-meaning of the gospels are implausible, given the
realistic-narrative genre of these texts. Some have proposed mythical interpretations. But these are obviously not myth texts, says Frei. Some have proposed
allegorical interpretations. But these are not allegory texts. Some have proposed
fable, or parable, interpretations. But these are not fable or parable texts (though
they contain some parables). Some have proposed locating the 'meaning' of
these texts in the consciousness of those who composed them. But the sole
'meaning' of these texts is the story they are used to tell. Yet others have proposed
identifying the 'meaning' of these texts with the various events that took place
in first century Palestine which these texts are supposedly 'about.' But that is
once again to fly in the face of the fact that the sole meaning of these texts is
the story which they project.
Frei offers an account of why this "eclipse" of biblical narrative took place.
Commentators on the Bible down through the ages recognized the realistic narrative character of large stretches of the biblical texts-in particular, of the
gospels. They identified this history-like character of the text with the "literal"
sense of the text; and they identified this, in tum, with the text's being about
certain historical events (or perhaps Frei means to say, with the historical events
that the text was supposedly about). "In the days before empirical philosophy,
Deism, and historical criticism," says Frei, "the realistic feature had naturally
been identified with the literal sense which in tum was automatically identical
with reference to historical truth. "10
But then arose the conviction that Jesus had not been resurrected, had not
performed signs and wonders; etc. One possible response to this conviction, by
those who shared it, would have been to conclude that the gospels perpetrated
falsehoods. Very few chose this response, since almost all of them still embraced
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the Bible as canon. II Hence the whirling search for alternative interpretations-a
search which, in Frei's view, over and over bumps up against the stubbornly
history-like (realistic narrative) character of these writings.
Meaning and narrative shape bear significantly on each other. Even if
one was convinced that the history-like or realistic character of the
narratives finally bespoke an illusion, so that their true history either
had to be reconstructed historically or their true sense explained as
allegory or myth, the realistic character was still there. This led to the
odd situation described above. Some commentators explained the
realistic feature by claiming that the stories are reliably or unreliably
reported history. Others insisted that they are not, or only incidentally,
history and that their real meaning is unconnected with historical reporting. In either case, history or else allegory or myth, the meaning of the
stories was finally something different from the stories or depictions
themselves, despite the fact that this is contrary to the character of a
realistic story. 12
The solution, says Frei, is to recognize clearly that whether or not these are
history-like is just a different issue from whether or not the author-meaning of
these texts is accurate history. Frei speaks in the counterfactual mood in the
following passage, but the thought expressed is his own:
... in order to recognize the realistic narrative feature as a significant
element in its own right (viz., as a story's making literal rather than allegorical or mythical or some other nonliteral sense regardless of whether
the literal sense is also a reliable factual report) one would have had to distinguish sharply between literal sense and historical reference. And then
one would have had to allow the literal sense to stand as the meaning, even
if one believed that the story does not refer historically. But commentators, especially those influenced by historical criticism, virtually to a man
failed to understand what they had seen when they had recognized the
realistic character of biblical narratives, because every time they acknowledged it they thought this was identical with affirming not only the
history-likeness but also a degree of historical likelihood of the stories.
Those who wanted to affirm their historical factuality used the realistic
character or history-likeness as evidence in favor of this claim, while
those who denied the factuality also finally denied that the history-likeness was a cutting feature-thus in effect denying that they had seen
what they had seen because (once again) they thought history-likeness
identical with at least potentially true history.
In both affirmative and negative cases, the confusion of history-like-
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ness (literal meaning) and history (ostensive reference), and the hermeneutical reduction of the former to an aspect of the latter meant that
one lacked the distinctive category and the appropriate interpretive procedure for understanding what one had actually recognized: the high
significance of the literal, narrative shape of the stories for their meaning.
And so, one might add, it has by and large remained ever since. 13
III
The story is the meaning of the gospel text, says Frei. And acknowledging
that the story is realistic (history-like) in character carries no implication whatsoever as to whether the story is accurate history, or even meant as history.
Once these points are granted, then two very different projects loom before one:
the project of historical criticism and the project of literary criticism. Frei' s great
contribution was to have seen with clarity and argued with cogency that these
are indeed two distinct projects. The gospels, he says, "tell a story of salvation,
an inalienable ingredient of which is the rendering of Jesus as Messiah,
and ... whether or not he was so in historical fact, or thought of himself as
Messiah (i.e., whether the story refers or not) or whether the notion of a Messiah
is still a meaningful notion, are different questions altogether. To the 'narrative'
perspective, these latter questions would have to do not with meaning or hermeneutics but with an entirely separable historical and theological judgment. "14
But once the distinction is drawn clearly between the structure and character
of the author-meaning of these texts, and the events of first-century Palestine,
does not the person with religious interests tum from the former to the latter-from
literary criticism to historical criticism? Does not Frei's argument have the consequence, ironically, that the motivation for historical criticism is not diminished
but clarified and strengthened?
Eclipse gives no decisive answer to this question. It appears, however, to take
the opposite tum from that proposed by this imagined objector. Frei shares the
church's embrace of the Bible as canon. And he applauds what he describes as
the "pre-modem" view that to accept the Bible as canon is to struggle to fit
oneself into its storied universe. 15 For the person of religious concerns, the
narrative counts.
What is not at all clear is what Frei has in mind as his rationale for this view.
Frei's pre-modem predecessors were clear: We try to fit ourselves into the biblical
story because that story tells us what happened. Indeed, it tells us of the most
important things that have ever happened. Our weal depends on how we relate
ourselves to those happenings. In Eclipse Frei appears to reject this rationale.
With what does he mean to replace it? Does he believe that the narrative all by
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itself serves to 'edify' the church?
The ambiguities of Eclipse are resolved by Frei's later book, The Identity of
Jesus Christ. There he makes clear that he is not advocating a scripto-centric
version of Christianity. In the Preface he says that he affirms the resurrection
of Christ "as an indispensable Christian claim"; and the book itself is the outworking of that affirmation. This affirmation does not lead Frei to plunge into
historical criticism. That continues to be of little interest to him.16 Nonetheless
he says that to be a believer is at some point to "make the transition from literary
description to factual, historical, and theological judgment .... "17
This position also counts as Frei's answer to another way of responding to
his main argument. I have said that Frei, along with all or almost all of those
he criticizes, was concerned with the author-meaning of the gospels. But suppose
that someone proposes discarding this concern. That seems to me to have been,
in fact, what Kant proposed in his Religion within the Limits of Reason. Of
course anyone who proposes this still has to cope with the realistic narrative
character of these texts. Nonetheless, one's freedom is at once expanded if one
no longer aims to adopt an interpretation which coincides with the author-meaning
of these texts.
The terminology in which Frei conducts his argument prevents him from ever
seeing this option with clarity. Yet one can surmise what his response would
be. It would have two parts. The attempt to fit ourselves into the story projected
by the gospel writers continues to be of benefit to the church. And whether or
not Jesus had the identity that the gospel writers say he had/has remains of
intense religious importance to the church, and indeed to all humanity.
IV

Before we tum to Frei's explication of the author-meaning of the gospels, let
me reflect briefly on his picture of interpretation and explication as autonomous,
texts-focussed, activities-a picture, I might add, that he shared with the New
Critics in literary studies. I shall confine myself to points relevant to our project
in this paper.
Suppose one shares with Frei the goal of adopting as one's interpretation of
a text that which the writer used the text to say. Then surely taking Flaubert's
works as fiction rather than history belongs to adopting an interpretation of his
text, as does taking Gibbon's works as history rather than fiction. For what
someone used a text to say consists of the speech actions he performed by his
use of the text. And a speech action consists not only of a state of affairs but
of a stance taken up toward that state of affairs. Frei, however, regularly speaks
of the interpreter as having nothing to say on the issue of whether the gospels
were meant as fiction or history. He observes, correctly, that the texts can be
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used either way. He also observes, again correctly, that though their history-likeness makes them suitable for history, it does not establish that the world they
were used to project actually occurred. But from this it does not follow that
hermeneutics is unconcerned with the determination: History or fiction. What
the historian asserts may be false and what the fictioneer projects may be true.
So truth and falsehood do not determine whether a text is used for history or
fiction. That is determined by the mood of the projection. But the mood belongs
to what the author meant with the text.
Just as adopting an interpretation of a text is, in this way, not an autonomous,
text-focussed, procedure, so also explicating an interpretation already adopted
is not such a procedure. Consider the following passage from Frei's Eclipse:
The position "thatthe authority of the Bible for belief is gone ... was universally
rejected among theologians and non-theologians. One either claimed that the
texts really do mean what they state, that salvation comes through Jesus Christ
alone and that this is a significant and not an anachronistic statement; or else
one said that this, taken literally, would be an insignificant statement and therefore
cannot be what the texts mean."18 To this passage let us add a sentence which
occurs just a bit more than a page later: "Hermeneutically, it may well be the
most natural thing to say that what these accounts are about is the story of Jesus
the Messiah, even if there was no such person .... "14
Let us suppose that the gospel texts contain the sentences "Salvation comes
through Jesus Christ alone" and "Jesus is the Messiah." Let us suppose further
that the interpretation we want to adopt is that consisting of what the first
writer/redactor of these gospel texts used them to say. We now want to get a
firm grip on the actual structure and content of these interpretations-Dn the
content of these projected-worlds-cum-modes-of-projection. We want, in short,
to explicate our interpretation.
So suppose that when the writer of the text wrote, "Salvation comes through
Jesus Christ alone," he was referring to the existent person Jesus from Nazareth.
Then for the projected state of affairs to occur there would have to be this person
and salvation would have to come through him alone. Whether the world is
projected in the assertive or in the fictive mood makes no difference to this.
Now consider the alternative possibility. Suppose that Jesus from Nazareth
had not existed. Then no one could refer to him, no one could tell a story about
him; etc. Frei says that "even if there was no such person," nonetheless "what
these accounts are about is the story of Jesus the Messiah." Perhaps that is
true-though I myself would have said that the accounts present to us the story
rather than that they are about the story. But in any case, if Jesus of Nazareth
had not existed, then these accounts would not have been about him, the writers
would not have referred to him, etc. And so, different states of affairs would
have been projected, states of affairs which do not entail the existence of Jesus.
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The projected worlds of the two cases are different. Hence it is that explication,
understood as the procedure of describing the contents and structure of the
interpretation adopted, is not an autonomous procedure, to be conducted simply
by studying texts. What one judges to be the content of the interpretation depends
(among other things) on which words of the text one takes to have been used
to refer. And that is not, in general, to be determined by scrutinizing the words.
But now thirdly, let us reflect on Frei's insistence that canonicity not be
allowed to put pressure on hermeneutics. As we have seen, Frei operates with
the assumption that a text inherently has a meaning; and he regards interpretation
as the attempt to discern that meaning. If one thinks along these lines, then
obviously canonicity is irrelevant to interpretation. 20 But once we see that arriving
at an interpretation of a text presupposes an act of practical reason, then it is
no longer obvious that a community's desire to use a text canonically is irrelevant
to its choice as to which interpretation to adopt. Frei argues with great cogency
that the genre of the gospel texts imposes stringent restrictions on what can
properly be adopted as an interpretation-restrictions which most modem innovative interpretations have violated. But it remains true that the genre does not
close down the range of allowable interpretations to just one.
I share Frei's assumption that there are powerful reasons, in the case of the
gospels, for the church to adopt as its preferred interpretation that which the
writers used these texts to say. 21 But for that choice, reasons are indeed needed;
alternatives cannot all be dismissed out of hand as not even qualifying as interpretations. And it would be wise to remember that the New Testament writers, in
the interpretations they adopted of Old Testament texts, often chose differently.

v
Frei's project in The Identity of Jesus Christ was to explicate the overall
structure of that interpretation of the gospels which he had adopted. Though the
gospels are oriented entirely around the person Jesus of Nazareth, they are not
biography in the contemporary mode. They are, says Frei, narratives designed
to answer the question, "Who is Jesus"? They offer "a rendering of the identity
of Jesus" in history-like form.
Frei (along with most others) sees the gospel narratives as coming in three
relatively distinct parts: Jesus before his public ministry; the public ministry;
and the passion and resurrection of Jesus. Frei's view is that though we are not
"to ignore the story of Jesus' ministry in identifying him ,"22 nonetheless
" ... Jesus' individual identity comes to focus directly in the passion-resurrection
narrative rather than in the account of his person and teaching in his earlier
ministry. It is in this final and climactic sequence that the storied Jesus is most
of all himself ... we are confronted with him directly as the unsubstitutable
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individual who is what he does and undergoes and is manifested directly as who
he is."23 And what is "the identity of Jesus," as presented in the gospels?
He is the man from Nazareth who redeemed men by his helplessness,
in perfect obedience enacting their good in their behalf. As that same
one, he was raised from the dead and manifested to be the redeemer.
As that same one, Jesus the redeemer, he cannot not live, and to conceive
of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is. 24
Though Frei is certainly right in claiming that Jesus' role of redeemer is
essential to his identity as presented in the gospels, to me it appears that Jesus'
role of authoritative spokesman for and about God is also essential. And if that
is so, then the second main part of the gospel narratives, the part concerned with
Jesus' public ministry, carries more significance than Frei grants to it. But that
can pass here. For on his central claim, that the gospels are meant principally
to answer the question, "Who was/is this person Jesus?"-about that, it seems
to me, Frei is right.
If the central purpose of these narratives is to depict the identity of Jesus, then
the intent of the wri~ers is not frustrated if the story, in some of its details, does
not match what actually transpired. For it may not have been the writers' intent
that it would nor their claim that it did. So as to present the identity of Jesus
the writers may sometimes have taken actual episodes but put them into a different
order from that in which they actually occurred, have taken things Jesus said on
separate occasions and put them into one unified speech, etc. And if that is so,
then the attempt to figure out in detail, on the basis of the gospel narrative, what
actually happened, is an enterprise whose results will always remain shaky. 25
Nonetheless, "This one thing historians and novelists have in common," says
Frei: "they deal with specific actions and specific human identities. If a novel-like
account is about a person who is assumed to have lived, the question offactuality
is virtually bound to arise, for psychological if no other reasons, either at specific
points or over the whole stretch of the account. "26 We must keep in mind, indeed,
that "the force or urgency of the question does not make a positive answer to it
any more credible. "27 Yet the urgency is there. And it is especially powerful
when it comes to the narrative of the resurrection. For here there is more involved
than just the fact that "the resurrection account, by virtue of its exclusive reference
to Jesus, ... allows and even forces us to ask the question, "Did this actually
take place?"28 'The passion-resurrection account tends to force the question of
factuality because the claim is involved as part of the very identity that is described
as enacted and manifested in the story-event sequence. "29 That is to say: the
identity of Jesus, as presented by the gospels, requires that he have been raised
from the dead. The resurrection is essential to his presented identity. ',(D)isbelief
in the resurrection of Jesus is rationally impossible," says Frei;3() by which he
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means, "to conceive of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is."3! "To
think him dead is the equivalent of not thinking of him at all."32 And so, since
the identity of Jesus matters to us religiously, the historicity of his resurrection
matters.
At last, then, Frei poses the question: "What is involved in belief in the
resurrection?" He makes one last bow to his long line of argument: "Having
directed attention all along to the descriptive structure of the accounts and not
the factual historicity of their contents, we must say that belief in Jesus' resurrection is more nearly a belief in something like the inspired quality of the
accounts than in the theory that they reflect what 'actually took place. "'33 But
then he adds:
at one point a judgment of faith concerning the inspiration of the descriptive contents and a judgment of faith affirming their central factual claim
would have to coincide for the believer. He would have to affirm that
the New Testament authors were right in insisting that it is more nearly
correct to think of Jesus as factually raised, bodily if you will, than not
to think of him in this manner. (But the qualification "more
nearly ... than not" is important in order to guard against speculative
explanations of the resurrection from theories of immortality, possibilities of visionary or auditory experience, possibilities of resuscitating
dead bodies, miracles in general, etc.p4
In what follows, I propose to work with Frei's explication ofthe author-meaning
of the gospels. For this explication of this interpretation satisfies my initial
requirement, that it not only seem plausible to me but have standing in the
hermeneutical community. For those who do not wish to accept author-meaning
as their interpretation, or dispute Frei's explication of that, what follows can be
understood hypothetically: If this interpretation and explication are adopted, then
what is to be said about conditions for being entitled to believe it?

VI
The question on everybody's lips was, "Who is this person Jesus?"-the
mysterious wonder-working, Spirit-filled, charismatic sage and holy man from
Nazareth who spoke "with authority." It was a question Jesus himself put to this
disciples: "Who do men say that I am? And who do you say that I am?" In
narrative fashion the gospel writers present their answer to the question. Their
presentations were accepted by that element of the "Jesus-party" which became
the church, and were handed down as canonical tradition. Presumably they were
accepted because they themselves reflected tradition in the Jesus-party. Saying
that he had tried to write "an orderly account," Luke compared his effort to
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those of others who had "undertaken to compile a narrative of the things which
have been accomplished among us." He suggested that he, along with those
others, had based his narrative on what had been "delivered to us by those who
were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word." The gospels are crystallized
inscribed tradition. And at the bottom of that tradition is testimony.
What is handed down as tradition can, in general, be accepted in two quite
different ways. Sometimes one can inquire independently into its acceptability
without taking one's predecessors at their word on anything relevant to the matter;
that done, one may find oneself believing what they said, thus accepting the
tradition. The other way of accepting what is handed down as tradition is to take
one's predecessors at their word-to believe what they said on their say so, on
their authority. To take their word for it.
When tradition is complex, then sometimes one can blend these two. The
blend may be of different sorts. One blend is this: If part of the tradition stands
to other parts as evidence, and one discerns that it does, then one can accept
the evidential part on sayso while determining for oneself whether the evidence
supports the conclusion.
Though perhaps there are some who accept everything that the gospel writers
say on their sayso, there are many who accept what they say in the blended way
suggested. However, no one (since the second century) who accepts what they
say does so without taking them at their word on some historical matters. Independent access to the propositions they assert is for us much too meager for it
to be otherwise. Thus epistemological reflection on the phenomenon of accepting
what the gospel writers say requires, unavoidably, reflection on the phenomenon
of believing something on someone's sayso. Of course, if the gospel writers had
not presented a narrative rendering of the identity of Jesus but propounded general
moral claims, or general claims about the human condition, in highly pictorial
language, then we might well have had independent access to the propositions
they asserted and thus, in principle, found ourselves able to accept what they
say without accepting any of it on their sayso.
A necessary condition of believing something on someone' s sayso is believing
it because he said so. His saying it must playa causal role in one's coming to
believe. But how, more specifically, does the causal process go?
There has to be available a language for saying things. And then, if I am to
believe p on your sayso, you must use the language to say p and I, in the
paradigmatic case, must have a good enough grasp of the language to discern
that you said p. My discerning that you said p then causes in me the belief that
p. Your sheer utterance of the words might also evoke beliefs in me, as might
your manner of uttering them. And in the odd case, the belief evoked by the
words or the manner might be a believing of the very same proposition that you
asserted. But that would not be believing what you said on your sayso.
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What is it to discern that you said p? It's at least this: to believe that you said
p. It's more than this, though; because I might come to believe that you said p

without discerning that you did. But this point leads us to consider whether
believing something on someone' s sayso is a phenomenon which goes beyond
the paradigmatic case in which I discern what you said. Suppose that I come to
believe that you said p not by discerning that you did through attending to your
words but by being told that you did, or inferring it. May I not nonetheless
believe what you said on your sayso? It appears to me that 1 can. So I suggest
that no matter how I come to believe that you said p, if I correctly believe that
you said p, and this believing of mine immediately causes in me the belief that
p, then I believe p on your sayso.
What is the qualifier immediately meant to do here? It's meant to eliminate
cases of rationally grounded inference to p from my belief that you said p,
coupled with my belief that p is a logically or causally necessary condition of
your saying p. Suppose I reason: "You said p; but you couldn't say p without
p being true; so p." Then I don't believe p on your sayso.
But suppose I have beliefs about the reliability of certain types of speech and
that, appealing to some such conviction, I reason as follows: "Type such-and-such
of speech is reliable; your saying p belongs to that type; so probably p." And
suppose that this reasoning leads me to believe not just that probably p but that
p. Or suppose my reasoning goes thus: Your sayingp belongs to a reliable speech
type (i.e., some reliable speech type or other); so probably p. Is coming to
believe p along these lines--call it reason-grounded believing-a case of
believing p on your sayso? Surely it is. Thus the qualifier "immediately" in the
principle formulated at the end of the next to last paragraph excludes cases which
should not be excluded if it were to be formulated not only as a sufficient, but
as a necessary, condition.
One more point on the matter of identifying the phenomenon of believing on
sayso. Suppose someone assertively utters "I believe it's snowing," and that my
discerning that he said that causes me to believe that it's snowing. Might this
not be a case of believing that it's snowing on his sayso? Yet it appears that he
did not assert what I believe. For I believe that it's snowing. But he appears to
have asserted that he believes that it's snowing.
Appearances are deceiving. By uttering the sentence "I believe that it's snowing," a person will normally assert not only that he believes it's snowing but
that it's snowing. Such cases, then, leave the principle intact that only what one
person asserts can another believe on his sayso. Of course it's possible to use
the sentence without asserting that it's snowing-for example, by putting heavy
stress on the word "believe": "I believe that it's snowing." If your saying that
causes me to believe that it's snowing, then I will believe p not on your sayso
but (probably) on what I take to be your sayso. We often believe something on
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what we take to be someone's say so when it is not in fact on their sayso that
we take it.
VII
One's believing that so-and-so said p causes in one the belief that p: This is
the phenomenon that constitutes the heart of believing p on someone's sayso.
One can understand why the Enlightenment philosophers were wary. Our human
practice of drawing the appropriate conclusion from a modus ponens argument
seems to have an eminently good rationale: We see that the conclusion follows.
Except in the odd case, however, between that so-and-so said p and that p we
do not see any relationship of entailment. Their solution was to insist that
believing on say so ought always to be reason-grounded. And they spoke to the
matter of the kinds of reasons and how we get them.
We must in everything be guided by Reason, said Locke-by which he (and
his followers) meant: By Reason plus immediate experience. Our beliefs must
all be grounded on direct insight into reality. How else are we to be delivered
from wandering in darkness? Specifically, then: Having discerned that someone
said p, we must have available to us adequate evidence that his saying p belongs
to a reliable speech-type; we must also have available adequate evidence, pro
and con, concerning the truth of p itself; and only if p seems to us more probable
than not on adequate scrutiny of all that evidence are we to believe p on sayso.
Locke's insistence that it is possible to ground say so-believing entirely on
insight was already decisively attacked by Hume. Hume argued that the inductive
inference, from experienced samples of a certain speech-type to the belief that
the speech-type as a whole is reliable, is unalterably a product of custom/habit
rather than of rational insight. But though Hume thus destroyed the foundationalist
underpinnings of Locke's thesis that we are entitled to believe something on
sayso only if our doing so is reason-grounded and our reasons acquired by the
evidential activity, I see no evidence that Hume disagreed with the thesis itself.
After all, Hume too was a person of the Enlightenment, sharing its hostility to
unexamined tradition. The honor offirst questioning the thesis belongs to Thomas
Reid.
Reid's reflections on the topic began with the question: What is the dynamic
which accounts for our believing things on sayso? He conceded that sometimes
what is at work is reasoning from beliefs produced by induction. But he argued
that not all believing on sayso can be analyzed as being of the reason-grounded
variety. Some is the output of what he dubbed the credulity principle, and which
he held to be an innate "original principle of our constitution"35 implanted in us
by God. His argument, persuasive in my judgment, went as follows:
if nature had left the mind of the hearer in equilibria, without any
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inclination to the side of belief more than to that of disbelief, we should
take no man's word until we had positive evidence that he spoke
truth . . . . It is evident, that, in the matter of testimony, the balance
of human judgment is by nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns
to that side of itself, when there is nothing put into the opposite scale.
If it was not so, no proposition that is uttered in discourse would be
believed, until it was examined and tried by reason; and most men
would be unable to find reasons for believing the thousandth part of
what is told them . . . .
Children, on this supposition, would be absolutely incredulous; and
therefore absolutely incapable of instruction: those who had little knowledge of human life, and of the manners and characters of men, would
be in the next degree incredulous: and the most credulous men would
be those of greatest experience, and of the deepest penetration; because,
in many cases, they would be able to find good reasons for believing
the testimony, which the weak and the ignorant could not discover.
In a word, if credulity were the effect of reasoning and experience,
it must grow up and gather strength, in the same proportion as reason
and experience do. But if it is the gift of nature, it will be strongest in
childhood, and limited and restrained by experience; and the most superficial view of human life shows, that the last is really the case, and
not the first. 36

Corresponding to the credulity principle and giving it relevance there is also
in human beings, on Reid's view, an innate impulse to assert something only if
one believes it to be true-a "principle of veracity":
This principle has a powerful operation, even in the greatest liars; for,
where they lie once, they speak truth a hundred times. Truth is always
uppermost, and is the natural issue of the mind. It requires no art of
training, no inducement or temptation, but only that we yield to a natural
impulse. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and
is never practised, even by the worst men, without some temptation.
Speaking truth is like using our natural food, which we would do from
appetite, although it answered no end; but lying is like taking physic,
which is nauseous to the taste, and which no man takes but for some
end which he cannot otherwise attain. 37
Reid was of the view that the principle of credulity is "unlimited in children,
until they meet with instances of deceit and falsehood. "38 Our response to meeting
with instances of deceit and falsehood is to begin discriminating between reliable
and unreliable types of speech and to form beliefs about these types which then
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become available to us as reasons. This has two results. Sometimes the activation
of the credulity principle is checked by our reasoning that the speech before us
is probably false because it is of a type which (we have come by induction to
believe) is unreliable. And sometimes the activation of the credulity principle is
overwhelmed by our believing what was said for the reason that it is probably
true, since it is of a type which (we have come by induction to believe) is highly
reliable. In the one case reasoning checks the activation of the credulity principle
and in the other case it overwhelms it. But if the principle is neither checked
nor overwhelmed in a specific case of discerning that someone said something,
it does its work. Reason, says Reid,
learns to suspect testimony in some cases, and to disbelieve it in others,
and sets bounds to that authority to which she is at first entirely subject.
But still, to the end of life, she finds a necessity of borrowing light
from testimony, where she has none within herself, and of leaning in
some degree upon the reason of others, where she is conscious of her
own imbecility.
And as in many instances, Reason, even in her maturity, borrows
aid from testimony; so in others she mutually gives aid to it, and
strengthens its authority. For as we find good reason to reject testimony
in some cases, so in others we find good reason to rely upon it with
perfect security, in our most important concerns. The character, the
number, and the disinterestedness of witnesses, the impossibility of
collusion, and the incredibility of their concurring in their testimony
without collusion, may give an irresistible strength to testimony, compared to which, its native and intrinsic authority is very inconsiderable. 39
Reid's suggestion, as to why none of us adults displays the unrestrained credulity
which he attributes to small children, is that on the basis of induction we acquire
beliefs concerning the reliability and unreliability of types of speech, and that these
then function as reasons for believing or not believing what people say. But this
cannot be the whole of the matter. Indeed, it cannot be what is most basic in
the matter. For to get the inductive practice going we have to judge on independent
grounds that certain items of speech are true and that certain items are false.
What accounts for such judgments? Obviously not induction.
Suppose that by the use of my perceptual faculties I come to believe that the
window is open-I saw it open, so I believe. But suppose that my mother remarks
that it was closed. Normally I will believe my eyes rather than my mother. If
this sort of thing happens often enough, the inductive practice will go to work
and I will begin to distrust my mother on certain matters (especially if I have
an explanation in hand for why she speaks falsely on such matters). But what
accounts for my not believing my mother in the first place?
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I propose the following model: All of us (after infancy) bring along aframework
of beliefs to our apprehension of someone saying something. And whether or
not we believe p on someone's sayso is a function (in part) of what we already
believe, of how firmly we believe it, of how we came to believe it, and of
whether or not we believe that p and our current framework of beliefs might
jointly be true.
For a given assertion, one's framework of beliefs may contain one or more
beliefs which function as inhibitors on one's acceptance of what was asserted,
the inhibitors yielding either disbelief or non-belief. Only if one's beliefframework were different with respect to this part of its content would one's
discerning that so-and-so said p operate on one in such a way as to produce in
one the belief that p. (If the temporal order is reversed, so that first one believes
on sayso and then one acquires the apparently conflicting belief, then the latter
belief functions as eliminator rather than inhibitor.) The example already given
of me, my mother, and the window, is of this sort. But let us have some more
significant examples before us. Many in the modem world have come to believe
that miracles cannot occur. Provided this belief is held firmly enough, it acts
for these persons as an inhibitor on their acceptance of the identity-narrative of
the gospels. Again, if I firmly believe that my access to the truth or falsehood
of p is as good as yours, that will usually inhibit my accepting p on your sayso.
And if Aquinas is right in his discussion of "faith and reason," then the principle
holds that if p is self-evident to one, then it is impossible for one to accept p
on someone's sayso.
Not only do the beliefs that one brings to an episode of someone saying
something often act as inhibitors. Sometimes they act instead as abettors. That
is to say, sometimes the beliefs we already have are a crucial component in the
total circumstance which causes us (with such-and-such firmness) to believe
something on sayso. Especially beliefs concerning the competence of the speaker
and beliefs as to the purity of his motivation function thus. Suppose, for example,
that I believe some mathematical proposition p because of the self-evidence
dynamic: upon grasping it I both find myself compelled to believe it and have
that experience classically described as "seeing it to be true." Normally that will
act as an inhibitor on my accepting not-p on someone's sayso. But if a person
whom I believe to be a great mathematical genius remarks to me that p is false,
I might well come to believe that it is false on his sayso. Or again, many believe
that the gospels are God's revelation, or were inspired by the Holy Spirit. Usually
such a conviction will not simply be held as a theological belief about scripture
but will function epistemically as an abettor, leading the person to believe more
firmly what the gospel writers say than would otherwise have been the case.
The beliefs we acquire inductively concerning the reliability and unreliability
of speech types fit directly into this model. The belief that the speech before me
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belongs to an unreliable type often functions as an inhibitor. And the belief that
the speech before me is of an unusually reliable type often functions as an abettor.
Let it be noted that an inhibitor/abettor belief concerning the reliability or
unreliability of types of speech need not be such that there is some type of which
I believe that it is reliable (unreliable) and that the speech before me is an example
of it. It may just be the belief that the speech before me belongs to some reliable
(unreliable) type or other. And surely the truth is that our actual discriminations
between specimens of reliable and unreliable types of speech are, in their subtlety,
far beyond our cognitive ability to single out those types.
One more supplement to Reid's articulation of his perspective is in order.
Suppose that upon discerning that someone said p, I believe p on his sayso.
Suppose further that I believe that his saying p is an example of a highly reliable
type of speech. It doesn't follow that I believe what he said for the reason that
it is an example of a highly reliable type of speech (from which I inferred that
p is probably true-this causing me to believe p itself). It may still be that my
discerning that he said p produces in me immediately the belief that p, with no
mediation of reasoning/inference-by the activation of the credulity principle.
In short, even if I have reasons for believing p on his sayso, my believing him
may not be reason-grounded. If my belief that his speech is of a reliable type
functions at all in the situation, it may function as an abettor without functioning
as a reason. It is my own impression that the credulity principle is less often
overwhelmed by reasoning than Reid seems to suggest. Even for adults, believing
on sayso is pervasively the product of our credulity principle. Similar comments
are to be made, mutatis mutandis, for the working of inhibitors.
And how does the Lockean thesis look when regarded from a Reidian perspective? It looks preposterous. We can't even bring it about that all our believing
on sayso is reason-grounded, let alone bringing it about that all such believing
has been prefaced by the evidential activity. The reason is not that striving thus
to eliminate unexamined tradition from our lives conflicts with other duties of
ours. The reason is that there could not be a human life of this sort. For there
could not be a human life without a human community. And there could not be
a human community, nor could persons be inducted into the community, without
the transmission of beliefs from one person to another by way of the credulity
principle. It is fantasy to suppose that one could suspend one's acceptance on
sayso of all that one's fellow human beings have told one and hold it all up to
judgment. All we can do is stand within our framework of beliefs, many of them
acquired by believing on sayso, and test some of what has been told us by
holding it up against other things told us-and now and then test some of it by
looking, listening, tasting, calculating, reflecting, recalling, etc. Examination of
tradition is always conducted within tradition unexamined.
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It will be said that this is an outmoded pOlin I. t to be making. Almost no one
anymore believes the Lockean thesis. Locke's tl":lesis had some plausibility given
his foundationalism; remove that, and there's little to be said for it. But one
would have to search long and hard nowadays to find a defender of Locke's
classical foundationalism. So why belabo:r the point?
On this occasion I have rejected the Loclkean thesis not for its presumed
foundationalism but for the reason that it hOiI ds out before us the illusory ideal
of eradicating from our existence the phenom(!non of immediately believing what
someone says on their sayso and of replacing it with reason and insight. But let
us take the objection as a challenge to carry the discussion farther.
Locke assumed that to be fully entitled to believe on their sayso what someone
said, one had to believe it for the reason that it appeared more probable than
not on adequate evidence adequately scrutinized. What about that basic assumption, that entitlement to believing on s.ayso requires believing for a reason. Is
that correct? To raise this question is t.o touch on issues placed on the agenda
of Western thought long before Locke--by Socrates and Plato. And let us now,
as we press this most basic question, also narrow our focus to believing what
the gospel writers say. What is the re.quired place of Reason and reasons in
believing their identity-narrative?
We must first speak a bit about the locus of epistemic obligation. Here we go
beyond Reid; for Reid speaks almost exclusively about epistemic practices,
hardly at all about epistemic obligation. Speaking truth, we say to each other
such things as "You should not have taken her at her word" and "You should
have believed what she told you." It's tempting to amplify such remarks as "You
should not have decided to take her at her word" and "You should have decided
to believe what she told you." But if the Reidian model of belief formation is
correct, this temptation must be resisted. Beliefs are not the outcome of decisions
but of dispositions.
Yet somewhere obligation enters the: picture. Where? At those points where
we, by decision, can affect the workings of our doxastic practices--can govern
their workings. What points are those? At least these: By acts of will we can
direct the attention of our epistemic faculties, by acts of will we can impair or
improve our epistemic faculties, and by acts of will we can attempt to keep in
or near the forefront of consciousness something we already believe.
Not only can we do such things by acts of will; often we ought to do them.
And often the fact that we have not done them when we ought to have done
them is reflected in what we do or do not believe on sayso. I ought to have
reminded myself of the many times this salesman has misled me; I would not
have taken him at his word if I had. It would not be amiss to express this by
saying that I ought not to have taken him at his word.
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Let us say that someone is fully entitled to some belief of theirs if it represents
no failure of governance-obligations on their part. Naturally many of our beliefs
are such that we are only partially entitled to them. We have fulfilled some of
our governance obligations and some not; the belief in question is the outcome
of that mixture.
Though an absence of full entitlement is the reflection of some failure of
proper governance, it must be noted that not all failure of proper governance
need be reflected in what one believes. It may be that even if one had inquired
into what one ought to have inquired into, one would still believe exactly as one
does now, having failed in one's duties. Being right in one's beliefs doesn't
necessarily get one off the hook. When it comes to epistemic obligation, it is
not beliefs but activities-governance activities-which are fundamental.
It's worth taking a moment to distinguish this notion of entitled belief from
the concept of warranted belief which Alvin Planting a has been analyzing in
some of his recent writings. 40 Suppose that after adopting the Reidian perspective,
which pictures all of us human beings, by virtue of our constitution, as engaged
in a variety of doxastic, dispositionally·-grounded practices, one takes a next step
of granting that these practices, in a given person, may be working either properly
or improperly. Then one can introduce the following concept--call it the concept
of warrant: A belief is warranted for a person just in case the doxastic practices
by which it was produced were functioning properly in the sort of environment
for which they were designed. Plantinga theorizes that it is warrant, thus conceived, which constitutes the normative component in our concept of knowledge.
Once one adopts the Reidian doxastic-practice perspective,.! then one can
readily recognize and devise a variety of normative concepts applicable to these
practices. Warrant and entitlement are just two of many. In this paper I confine
myself to entitlement. It is my judgment that the word "justified," which figures
so prominently in recent epistemological discussions, suffers the mortal defect
of being ambiguous as between warrant and entitlement. For that reason I have
avoided it-as I have also avoided the word "rational" as synonym for "entitled."
"Rational" connotes Reason and reasons; how entitlement is connected to those
is a question to be raised.
Let us now make the somewhat questionable assumption that it is within one's
powers of governance either to not believe the gospel writers on their say so or to do
so for reasons. Ought one to do so? Is this one of our obligations? If the believer
does not believe for a reason, does it follow that he has not fulfilled his governanceobligations? I see no reason to answer "Yes" to these questions. Believing on say
so need not in general be rationally grounded-cannot be. Why would this case be
different? Why would it be wrong in this case to let that fundamental and indispensable component of our constitution, the credulity principle, do its work?
Normally if we want to know whether the believer has fulfilled her governance-
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obligations it will pay to look in a different direction. Has she reflected as much as
she ought on potential defeaters? If she had, would her belief-system have contained
an inhibitor on her belief? Is she entitled to not have an inhibitor? When there's
something wrong about somebody's believing something on sayso, usually what's
wrong is not that their believing is not rationally grounded but that, ifthey had done
what they ought to have done, they would believe less firmly, or not at all: Their
belief-system would contain an inhibitor on this believing of theirs. And sometimes
it would contain an abettor; they would believe more firmly than they do. Naturally
this last point applies to the gospel case too.
Some will feel dismay over my rejection of the need for rational grounding
and my embrace of the credulity principle as an entirely acceptable dynamic for
believing the gospel writers. But if so, then reflecting on the character of the
reasons relevant to such cases should evoke a dismay which is a sibling of this
dismay. Fundamentally, all reasons for believing on their sayso what someone
says are reasons to the effect that the person's speech is of a reliable sort. As
already observed, these reliability-reasons are of two kinds.
(1) One believes that the speech before one belongs to some reliable type or
other.
(2) There is some speech-type of which one believes that it is reliable and that
the speech before one is an example of it.
Consider a reason of sort (1). One might hold (1) for a reason, a good reason;
if so, that reason is presumably a belief of type (2). But one might also hold it
immediately. Experience will have developed in one a certain belief-disposition;
and the activation of that disposition on this occasion immediately produces in
one the belief. But to judge such a belief an acceptable reason for believing-and
often we would not be able to give any other-is to give one's blessing to a
belief-disposition which, like the credulity-disposition, does not yield insight.
Suppose on the other hand that one's reason is of the second sort. Then the
question is how one came to believe, of a certain speech type, that it is reliable.
Certain logical inferences might of course be involved. But at a certain point,
if the belief has been formed properly, one comes back to the fact that one has
tested for reliability a certain sample of the type and made an inference from
the sample to the type as a whole. Either that, or one believes someone who
tells one that the type is reliable-in which case all the same considerations
apply to that person's speech (unless) one believes that the someone in question
who tells one that the type is reliable cannot speak falsely, for example, believing
that God tells one that all of Scripture is reliable. Now if the inference from
sample to type is to be reliable, the sample has to be representative. But as
Hume observed, in the nature of the case neither reason nor any other mode of
insight tells one that it is. The inductive practice is like the credulity-disposition
in that it is not a species of reason or insight. That ancient beckoning vision, of
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grounding our beliefs entirely on reason, or on reason supplemented with other
modes of direct insight into reality, must be surrendered-even if we believe
that here and there we do have such insight.
I have not contended that it is wrong for believers to believe for reasons. Nor
have I contended that it is never obligatory for them to do so. Neither have I
denied that there are some legitimate projects for which even something like the
evidential activity is the required or appropriate implementation. I have only
contended that it is not in general obligatory for Christian believers to believe
the identity-narrative of the gospels for reasons. Christian belief does not have
to be rationally grounded. But let it be observed once more that the fideism, or
more strictly, the anti-evidentialism, which I have been defending (a near-relative
of what Alvin Plantinga has called "Reformed epistemology") is not a form of
dogmatism. For I have assumed that for some Christians, at least, there are
certain objections lodged against the truth of the gospels of which they ought to
take note and on whose cogency they ought adequately to reflect. Failure to do
so may deprive their belief of entitlement.
Carrying out these obligations will require a good deal of reasoning. Sometimes
it may even require the evidential activity or something rather like it. So reason,
reasons, and reasoning are not irrelevant to the obligations of the believer. The
question which naturally arises is whether it is possible to give some general
description of their relevance, or more generally, some general formula for the
governance-obligations relevant to believing the identity-narrative of the gospel
writers on their say so. Gary Gutting has argued that religious believers are required
to justify their believing to certain of those who disagree with them, on pain of no
longer being entitled to their belief. Hans Albert has argued that religious believers
are obligated to look for refutations of their beliefs; they are entitled to their beliefs
only if, while looking for refutations, they have not found any .42 And there are yet
other proposals which have been made. None of those with which I am acquainted
appears to me satisfactory. Nor have I anything to put in their place.
But perhaps what we need is a new model for our thought about these matters-a
model more like that emerging from some recent discussions of practical rationality and hermeneutics. Perhaps every community operates with a whole texture
of rules for proper governance which it then teaches to its young members.
Perhaps these rules are usually at some points contested within the community,
perhaps they change with more or less rapidity under a wide variety of pressures,
and perhaps different communities operate with different such rules. And perhaps
a given society'S rules must be appraised not by reference to some "eternal"
rules but by reference to how well the rules in question serve the flourishing,
the shalom, of that community. Of course, the question of what constitutes the
flourishing of a given community, and of communities in general, is also not
without dispute. Following out these beckoning paths for reflection will have to
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remain the project for some other occasion.
"No matter what the logic ofthe Christian faith," says Hans Frei in one place,
"actual belief in the resurrection is a matter of faith and not of arguments from
possibility or evidence. "43 To this he adds in another place, "I am well aware
of, but not terribly distressed by, the fact that my refusal to speak speculatively
or evidentially about the resurrection of Christ, while nevertheless affirming it
as an indispensable Christian claim may involve me in some difficult logical
tangles. "44 Frei' s intuitions were more reliable than his apprehensions.
Frei speaks of faith; I have not. But faith does indeed enter the picture. One
cannot believe the identity-narrative of the gospel writers without feeling called
to believe in him of whom the narrative speaks-to have faith in him. The
difficulty of doing that constitutes for many the great inhibitor. Perhaps to explain
why some respond in faith and some do not, we must appeal to more than "flesh
and blood"-to the working of the Spirit. For we touch mystery here. Two
persons have the same objections. For the one, those objections inhibit acceptance. For the other, acceptance overcomes those objections.
IX

Our problems with traditions remain. The Enlightenment did not dispose of
them. Traditions are still the source of benightedness, chicanery, and oppression.
And our moral and religious traditions are more fractured today than ever before.
In this situation, examining our traditions remains for many of us a deep obligation-and for all of us together a desperate need. But we shall have to make do
without grand theses as to who ought to conduct what modes of examination.
And we shall have to acknowledge what the thinkers of the Enlightenment would
have found appallingly unpalatable: That examination of tradition can only take
place in the context of unexamined tradition.
By formulating and publicizing their governance thesis, the thinkers of the
Enlightenment hoped to bring about a rational consensus in place of fractured
tradition. That hope has failed. In my judgment it was bound to fail. Sometimes
epistemology does pry people loose from their worldview or religion; just as
often, their worldview or religion pries them loose from a certain epistemology.
Yet we must live together. It is to politics and not to epistemology that we
shall have to look for an answer as to how to do that. "Liberal" politics has
fallen on bad days recently. But to its animating vision of a society in which
persons of diverse traditions live together in justice and friendship, conversing
with each other and slowly altering their traditions in response to their conversation-to that, there is no viable alternative.
Yale University & Free University afAmsterdam
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NOTES
1. See Part Three, section XI, of my Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford, Oxford University Press;
1980).

2. For a recent survey of the controversies on these matters, see Colin Brown, Miracles and the
Critical Mind (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Pub!. Co.; 1984).
3. Particularity has two sides, worth distinguishing but often not distinguished: The historical particularity of God's salvific actions, and the historical particularity of those who have access to the knowledge of, and/or benefit of, those actions.
4. Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New Haven, Yale University Press; 1974).

5. "To state the thesis: A realistic or history-like (though not necessarily historical) element is a feature,
as obvious as it is important, of many of the biblical narratives that went into the making of Christian
belief. It is a feature that can be highlighted by the appropriate analytical procedure and by no other,
even if it may be difficult to describe the procedure-in contrast to the element itself. It is fascinating
that the realistic character of the crucial biblical stories was actually acknowledged and agreed upon by
most of the significant eighteenth-century commentators. But since the precritical analytical or interpretive procedure for isolating it had irretrievably broken down in the opinion of most commentators, this
specifically realistic characteristic, though acknowledged by all hands to be there, finally came to be
ignored, or--even more fascinating-its presence or distinctiveness came to be denied for lack of a
'method' to isolate it. And this despite the common agreement that the specific feature was there!"
Eclipse, p. 10.
6. Ibid., pp. 13-14. Compare the following passage from Frei's later book, The Identity of Jesus
Christ (Philadelphia, Fortress Press; 1975): "Realistic narrative reading is based on one of the characteristics of the Gospel story, especially its later part, viz., that it is history-like-in its language as well as
its depiction of a common public world (no matter whether it is the one we all think we inhabit), in the
close interaction of character and incident, and in the non-symbolic quality of the relation between the
story and what the story is about. In other words, whether or not these stories report history (either
reliably or unreliably), whether or not the Gospels are other things besides realistic stories, what they
tell us is a fruit of the stories themselves. We cannot have what they are about (the "subject matter")
without the stories themselves. They are history-like precisely because like history-writing and the
traditional novel and unlike myths and allegories they literally mean what they say. There is no gap
between the representation and what is represented by it."
7. See especially Parts Three and Four.
8. For example, on pp. 170 and 280 in Eclipse.
9. See especially Eclipse, p. 278.

10. Eclipse, p. 11.
11. See especially Eclipse, pp. 122 and 132-33.

12. Eclipse, p. 11.
13. Ibid, pp. 11-12.
14. Ibid., p. 133.
15. Frei, on p. 3 of Eclipse, cites a passage from Auerbach's Mimesis (p. 15): "Far from seeking,
like Homer, merely to make us forget our own reality for a few hours, it seeks to overcome our
reality: we are to fit our own life into its world, feel ourselves to be elements in its structure of
universal history . . . . Everything else that happens in the world can only be conceived as an
element in this sequence; into it everything that is known about the world . . . must be fitted as an
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ingredient of the divine plan." This sort of formula has now become commonplace among those
who approach the Bible in terms of narrative. For example, in Garrett Green (ed.) Scriptural Authority
and Narrative Interpretation (Philadelphia, Fortress Press; 1987), Charles Wood on p. 13 says that
"if a text functions narratively, to disclose a world in which its readers are invited to dwell, or to
depict a character in relation to whom the readers are invited to dwell ... "; Ronald Thiemann on
p. 31 says that "the reader recognizes a followable world within the texts and accepts an invitation
to enter that world"; and Kathryn Tanner on pp. 74-75 says that "Faithfulness to a Christian form
of life ... involves the constructive process of continually reinitiating a Christian self-understanding
by imaginatively repositioning the particulars of one's own life within a story."
16. For Frei's attitude toward historical criticism, see esp. pp. 135f. in Eclipse.
17, Identity, p. 150.
18. Eclipse, pp, 131-32.

19. Ibid., pp. 133-34.
20. Frei argues that, given the realistically narrative character of the gospels, interpreters must aim
at discerning the "literal sense" of the text. But it turns out that he means two quite different things
by "literal sense." What he is conscious of meaning is literal sense as opposed to allegorical, mythical,
and parabolic sense. But he also means by "literal sense," without being fully aware of doing so,
what the writer meant with his text. In fact, adopting an interpretation of the gospel texts which is
a literal sense in the former sense does not foreclose adopting an interpretation which is not a literal
sense in the latter.
21. Suppose, for example, that rather than giving up on canonicity after coming to the view that
Jesus was not at all what the gospel writers claimed he was, one interpreted the gospels as fictionrealistic narrative fiction. Then one would be in the position of embracing a story about a redeemer
without believing that there was a redeemer. And so one would not believe in Jesus, one would not
give him praise in the liturgy, one would not offer prayers in his name, etc., nor would one think
it correct to speak of oneself and others as doing that. Obviously the alterations in the life and
consciousness of the church would be gigantic if others went along with one--even though some
of the old familiar words might continue to be used, but now for new purposes.
22. Identity, p. 143.
23. Ibid., pp. 142-43.
24. Ibid., p. 149.
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26. P. 140.
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